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The history of the medical jurisprudence of insanity has not
yet found a pen worthy of so great a subject, although able pens
have essayed it, especially that of Morel.1 It has numerous
aspects, any one of which would serve in this age of research
for a copious monograph. The subject indeed reaches far back
iiito antiquity, and Roman law especially dealt, often wisely and
well, with all the various questions that concern the insane. From
so vast a field the mere essayist may well turn in despair.’
The object in this paper is merely to present some rather
curious matters concerning the evolution of trial by jury in
English law, and especially as these matters affected the insane.
It is the trial of the insane for crime in olden times that will
occupy us; for this is a subject fraught with great interest, and
one that has a bearing on what we see almost daily in our midst;
that is, the defence of insanity in our criminal courts. And yet
so large is even this limited subject, that in these pages I shall
hope merely to trace out the very gradual growth of the right
of an insane man, on trial for his life in an English court, to
be represented by counsel, and even to have his witnesses called
and sworn.
It doubtless seems now such an inalienable right for an accused
man, on trial for his life, to have counsel, and to call his wit-
nesses, that probably few persons are aware that these rights
have only been acquired after centuries of struggle, and only
within comparatively recent years; and that in former times the
1 Trait#{233}de Ia M#{233}decineL#{233}galedes Ali#{233}n#{233}s,Paris, i866.
‘The Institutes of Justinian contain many provisions for the insane, and
these were copied almost verbatim by Bracton in his De Legibus et Con-
suetudinil.’us Anglia about 1265, and thus found their way into the Eng-
lish common law.
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spectacle was sometimes displayed in the English courts of an
insane man being called on to make his own defence before a
jury, and to prove his own insanity, without the aid of counsel or
of sworn witnesses.
According to the old common law of England a man on trial
for either treason or felony was not allowed counsel; neither
was he allowed to call witnesses. In this latter respect the com-
mon law followed the civil law, or law of the Roman Empire.
Sir Fitzjames Stephen’ says that the right to call witnesses under
the Roman law was doubtful, and that even trial by jury in its
original form dispensed with witnesses altogether; that under
the civil law as administered all over the continent down to recent
times, the prosecutor only could call witnesses; and that in
England the prisoner’s right to call witnesses upon equal terms
with the Crown was not established till the reign of Queene Anne.
On this subject Blackstone4 says that as counsel was not allowed
to any prisoner accused of a capital crime, so neither should he
be suffered to exculpate himself by the testimony of any witnesses;
and it is to the credit of “Bloody Mary” that on one occasion
she instructed her chief justice that the prisoner should have
his witnesses the same as the crown. Nevertheless when the
courts at last grew ashamed of the old law, and admitted wit-
nesses for the defence, it was only on condition that they be not
sworn; hence their testimony was given less credit than the
witnesses for the crown, a fact which brought a protest from
Coke,’ who said there was not a scintilla juris in favor of such
tyranny; and at length by the statutes 7 Will. I I I c. 3 and i Ann.
St. 2 C. 9, it was allowed that in all cases of treason and felony
all witnesses for the prisoner should be examined upon oath in
like manner as the witnesses against him.
The effect of this old common law on the trials of the insane
must have been disastrous. In fact, the records of the English
courts before the reign of George I, so far as I can find, are almost
barren of well reported instances of such trials. This could
not have been because there were no such instances. Insane
men must have come to trial, for the insane have been with
us always, but the knowledge of insanity was so imperfect, that
‘History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. i, p. 46.
44 Com. 359. 63 Inst. 79.
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without the right to call witnesses and to have counsel, the lunatic
on trial for his life must have had such a poor show that he
usually left not even a trace in the annals of early English juris-
prudence. His trial indeed could have been little better than
a farce. Short indeed must have been his shrift. Let the modern
expert, who consumes whole days on the witness stand in full
view of an admiring public, pause and reflect on the compara-
tively recent progress in civilization which has called him into
existence.
The right of an accused man, hence of an accused lunatic, to
have counsel was even longer denied to him than the right to
call his witnesses, and, as we shall see, was not assured to him
in England until the year 1836. This hardship led to curious
episodes in English practice, which will be described briefly in
this paper.
According to that great oracle of the common law, Lord Chief
Justice Coke,’ the reasons for the old law were curious and
two fold:
“First, for that in case of life, the evidence to convict him
should be so manifest as it could not be contradicted.
Secondly, the court ought to see that the indictment, trial, and
other proceedings be good and sufficient in law, otherwise they
should by their erroneous judgment attaint the prisoner unjustly.”
In plain English the theory of the common law, as here given
by Coke, was that the judge was also the counsel for the prisoner,
and it was his duty to see that no injustice was done him, and
that he was not convicted except on evidence that was unmis-
takable. This became a pet theory of text-writers, and was
thought to proclaim the inherent nobility and grandeur of the
common law. Come, said the law to the prisoner, I will try
you and see that no injustice befalls you; but you must have no
counsel and call no witnesses, even if you hang for it.
Blackstone’ attempts to apologize for this rule of law, but only
makes matters worse; he applauds “that noble declaration of
the law, when rightly understood, that th& judge shall be counsel
for the prisoner.” But all the same, the learned commentator
did not approve of the law, and he attempts to explain it away.
‘3 Inst. 137. 74 Corn. 355.
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When a reader of to-day tries to imagine the notorious Judge
Jefferies acting as counsel for a prisoner on trial before him
for treason to the house of Stewart, he gives up the attempt in
vain. See, for instance, the report of the trial of Lady Alice
Lisle before this same Jefferies,’ in 1685. She was, indeed, not
insane, but aged and infirm, and so deaf that she could not hear
what was taking place at her trial. Her “crime” had been
entertaining a nonconformist minister who was said to have been
in Monmonth’s rebellion. Jefferies, who in the theory of the
law was “of counsel for the prisoner,” told the jury, after the
verdict, that he himself, if on the jury, would have voted to
convict her, “if she had been my own mother.” James II
refused to pardon her, although he graciously allowed her to
be beheaded instead of being burned at the stake. By special
act of Parliament, long after her execution, her attainder was
removed, and Jefferies denounced. This woman, physically and
mentally infirm, had stood her trial before a monster of injustice,
without sworn witnesses on the stand or counsel at her side.
In the case of Bateman,’ an insane man, of whom it was said
even at that time, 1685, that he ought never have been tried,
much less executed, the prisoner’s son only was allowed to help
him in his defence; but in those days it was held to be a mis-
demeanor to help a prisoner on trial, even by whispering a word
to him.
The only exception in favor of the prisoner was in case some
point of law arose proper to be debated.1’ This was a matter
within the discretion of the court; and the court itself appointed
the counsel for this special purpose, in some instances naming
the barrister whom the accused man himself chose.” But the
law denying counsel the right to examine witnesses or to address
the jury, was so unjust that Blackstone himself exclaims, “upon
what face of reason can that assistance be denied to save the
life of a man which yet is allowed him in prosecution for every
petty trespass?” In other words, a man had the right to have
counsel in petty cases, but not in cases of treason and felony
wherein his life was at stake. Such were the inconsistencies of
‘4 Hargrave, State Trials, o6. ‘Hargrave, 4, State Trials, 2o6.
1’Coke, 3 Inst. 137. Blackstone, 4 Corn. 355.
“Case of Rosewell, Howell’s State Trials, X, 147.
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the English criminal law, which condemned prisoners, sane and
insane alike, without allowing them to be properly heard. But
Blackstone further tells us that by his time the judges had become
so sensible of this defect that they did not scruple to allow a
prisoner counsel to instruct him what questions to ask or even
to ask questions for him. Hence, it was not until well on in
the i8th century that this injustice began slowly to be rectified.
Nevertheless it was not entirely corrected for nearly a century
later, for counsel were not allowed to address the jury, and men
continued to be tried for murder without being properly defended.
In the case of treason, however, the abuse was corrected earlier,
for by statute 7 Will. III C. 3, persons indicted for some forms of
treason were allowed two counsel, and the reason assigned by
Blackstone was, lest their cases should be prejudiced by “higher
influence,” meaning the influence of the King and the govern-
ment. But on the subject of insanity and high treason the
English common law had formerly been cruel and unjust, for
Coke tells us in the Beverly case 12 that “non combos mentis may
commit high treason; as, if he kills or offers to kill the King;”
and Lord Chief Justice Hale, referring to this passage in Coke,
says: “This is a safe exception, and I shall not question it,
becaue it tends so much to the safety of the King’s person.””
And so intense was this prejudice against the insane regicide that
by the statute, Henry VIII, Chap. 20, it was provided that if a
person, being of sound mind, should commit high treason, and
afterwards fall into madness, he might be tried in his absence, and
executed as if he were sane. That is, the lunatic had neither
the right to call witnesses, to have counsel, or even to be present
at his trial. But this infamous statute was too much even for
the olden times; it was repealed by statutes I and 2, Philip and
Mary, Chap. 10; and it has been condemned by all the best
authorities.14
As a part of the barbarous injustice of the old common law,
the prisoner was not allowed even to have a copy of the indict-
ment before trial; and a serio-comic scene was enacted in the
case of Rosewell,” on trial for high treason, when the prisoner,
a religious monomaniac, after being refused counsel, demanded
“4 Coke, 124. “I P. C., Chap. IV, p. 37. ‘ Blackstone, 4 Corn. 25.
“Howell, State Trials, X, 147.
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every once in a while in open court that the indictment be read
to him, now in English, and again in Latin. As the indictment
was interminably long, this process consumed much time and
sorely tried the patience of the lord chief justice.
Neither was the court satisfied in the olden times with exercis-
ing a parental control over the prisoner merely; it did the same
thing for the witnesses and the jury. Witnesses were abused and
menaced from the bench. Some of the harangues of Jefferies
while presiding at state trials are almost incredible; he accused
and railed at witnesses, calling them opprobrious names and
hurling blasphemous maledictions at them.” The lot of the jury
was no better; in fact it was sometimes even worse. In the
case of Sir N. Throckmorton, tried for high treason in 1554, the
jury, which acquitted the prisoner, were fined and imprisoned
for the verdict. Eight of them had to pay 220 pounds each,
and the other four got off, having apologized.” A recent English
writer” says that to go back even to the beginning of the 19th
century, is to return to an age of barbarism; and another writer”
says that formerly judges browbeat these defenceless prisoners,
jeered at their efforts to defend themselves, and censured juries
who honestly did their duty. Thus it was when the judge was
of counsel for the prisoner.”
There is a curious account of legal procedure in criminal cases
in a book written by Sir Thomas Smith, secretary of state to
Queen Elizabeth. From this book it appears that before the
English civil war, in the 17th century, the accused man before
trial was kept in close confinement and could not prepare for
his defence. He had no notice beforehand of the evidence against
him, and he was obliged to defend himself at his trial as best
he could, with no counsel to help him, and with no witnesses
in his behalf. There were no strict rules of evidence as there
are now; everything was left to the discretion, or caprice, of
the court; and the procedure often degenerated into a mere
wrangle between the prisoner and the witnesses for the crown.
“See Hargrave’s State Trials.
Stephen, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 6.
“Sir S. H. Poland, Century of Law Reform, p. .
“Odgers, ibid., p. 41.
 Commonwealth of England, Ch. XXV, pp. 183-201.
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How an insane man would fare in such a trial, may easily be
imagined.
In spite of its defects, however, the old common law of England
was in theory absolutely just to the insane; and no code of law
in any nation ever threw such safeguards about the lunatic.
Thus an insane man was not only exempt from the penalties of
crime, but it was also a part of the law that he should not even
be put on trial for his alleged offence so long as his insanity
endured. All the old authorities, such as Coke,” Hale,” Haw-
kins,N and Blackstone” are agreed on this subject. Hale says
that if a man of sound mind commit a capital offence, and before
his arraignment becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned; and
if after his plea, and before his trial, he becomes insane, he
shall not be tried; or if after his trial, he becomes insane, he
shall not receive judgment; or if after judgment, he becomes
insane, his execution shall be spared. Surely nothing could be
more humane than this.
But while in principle the common law was thus benign and
enlightened, in practice, as we have seen, it was harsh and
unreasonable. And that the practice of the courts, as it stood
in those days, was a most effectual deterrent to the plea of
insanity, is evident from an occasional writer of the times. Thus
an old commentator on the state trials, in the time of Charles II,
says that the defence of insanity had sometimes been tried in
capital cases, but with so little success that in his time it was
scarcely heard of.” This is not much to be wondered at when
the same writer tells us that in one case the prisoner’s wife was
threatened with being thrust out of court for merely whispering
to her husband what jurors he should challenge; that in another
case the prisoner’s wife was only by special permission allowed
to take a few notes for him; and that in still another case, that
of an insane apothecary on trial for high treason, the prisoner’s
son only was allowed to be with him and give him a little help,
although the accused man was dragged into court after ten weeks
of solitary confinement, in such a mental state that even the
court saw plainly that he was “moped mad.” These men were
“3 Inst. 4.  Pleas of the Crown, 34, 35.
I P. C., Chap. i,§3.  Chitty, Crim. Law, 761.
“4 Corn. 24, 395, 396. “4 State Trials, 2o5.
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all tried without being allowed legal counsel or sworn witnesses,
and the apothecary was hanged.
According to this same writer, it was no trifling thing even
to advise a man before his trial, and a solicitor had once been
indicted for high misdemeanor for merely giving advice before
trial to a person accused of high treason.
The extraordinary spectacle was thus sometimes presented of
a lunatic conducting his own defence. We see a man in jeopardy
of his life, trying to prove himself insane by the acumen with
which he examined and cross-examined the witnesses. The
prisoner, in order to prove that he was insane, was obliged to
reveal the fact that he had sufficient reason to conduct his own
case. If he did this-and it was his only chance-with some
show of coherence and insight, this very fact was seized upon
by the crown lawyers to prove that he was sane. In other words,
his predicament was such that the more he tried to prove by
witnesses that he was insane, the more he proved by his own
display of logic that he was not insane. Never was a man placed
between the two horns of such a dilemma.”
Let us take for instances the case of Edward Arnold, one of
the causes celebres, in medical jurisprudence. Arnold was tried
in 1724 for shooting at Lord Onslow with intent to kill. The
prisoner was a delusional lunatic, and believed himself persecuted
by Onslow, who, he thought, sent evil agents to annoy him, and
even got into his belly; he imagined also that he was bewitched
by the noble lord, and that the latter in some mysterious way
was responsible for most of the evils of the times. There were
marked aural hallucinations, insomnia, inability to work, and
the whole paranoiac outfit. When this man was brought to trial
an effort was made to have the judge permit a solicitor to be at
the prisoner’s side “to call his witnesses only;” but it was most
vehemently fought by four lawyers for the crown. They con-
tended that the judge was “of counsel for the prisoner,” and
that the attempt to prove him a lunatic “was a design to fore-
stall justice.” This was before a word of testimony had been
heard. “And the man to my sight,” said the leading lawyer for
“ Wharton & Still#{233},Med. Jurisprudence. From the author’s chapter on
“Insanity and the Law,” p. 525.
“ i6 Howell, State Trials, 465.
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the crown, “seems as sensible as myself or any person in court.”
Justice Tracy decided against allowing the prisoner any counsel,
but said he himself would give him all the assistance in his
power. He told the prisoner, “as all the witnesses come, if you
have any question to ask, put it to me, and I will ask your
question for you.” Also at the close of each witness’s examina-
tion the crown lawyer would say, “Arnold, would you ask this
witness any question?” To which the prisoner once replied: “I
don’t know. Ask him yourself if you have a mind.” His usual
answer was, “I don ‘t know what to say.” And truly he did not.
He was allowed a solicitor for part of the time; but there was
no proper cross-examination of the crown witnesses, and the
examination in chief of the witnesses for the defence was con-
ducted by the judge and the lawyers for the crown. It was
clearly proved, nevertheless, that the man was a delusional lunatic;
but the evidence made no impression on the minds of either court
or jury. No medical experts were called; and, no counsel being
allowed for the prisoner, his evidence was not properly mar-
shalled, and no address was made for him to the jury. All his
evidence, in short, went for nothing. When the poor wretch
attempted to ask questions of the witnesses, he was badgered by
the crown lawyers; and the judge, instead of acting as counsel
for him, as he had promised, told the jury, in a charge which
was destined to be forever famous, that a man could not be
acquitted on the defence of insanity unless he was “totally
deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know
what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a
wild beast.” The prisoner was promptly convicted and sentenced
to be hanged; but to the credit of the crown his sentence, at the
request of Lord Onslow, was commuted for imprisonment, and
he spent the remaining thirty years of his life in jail.
Perhaps the most dramatic and spectacular trial of a lunatic
that ever took place was that of the Earl Ferrers.” This English
nobleman was arraigned in 1750 for murdering his steward, Mr.
Johnson. The tribunal that tried him was not an ordinary
criminal court, but no less angust a body than the House of Lords,
because, according to English law, every man is entitled to a trial
before a jury of his peers; therefore an English earl makes his
“ 19 Howell, State Trials, 886.
44 THE TRIAL OF THE INSANE FOR CRIME [July
defence, when he commits a crime, before the upper House of
Parliament. The trial was conducted with great pomp and cere-
mony. The court was presided over by the lord high steward,
one of the highest offices under the English Constitution, but
usually in abeyance, and only filled for special occasions, such as
the coronation of a king or the trial of a peer for murder. The
details are too voluminous for quotation, or even for judicious
condensation, but every modern alienist, who feels an interest in
the history of his specialty, should read the highly entertaining
report of the proceedings as given in the I9th volume of the State
Trials.
Lord Ferrers was allowed no counsel, but was obliged to con-
duct the whole defence himself, not only against the attorney-
general, who was one of the ablest lawyers of his time, and
afterwards lord chancellor, but also with such eminent jurists as
Lord Mansfield and Lord Hardwicke present and ready to trip
him up. He was evidently carefully coached for the occasion,
and conducted the examination and cross-examination of wit-
nesses with remarkable skill. It is very evident that the impres-
sion he made upon his jurors-the whole House of Lords-was
highly unfavorable to his case, because the very skill with which
he conducted his defence was taken as evidence that he was of
sound mind; and the counsel for the crown were nothing loath
to take advantage of this point, and drive it home. The proceed-
ings of the trial read almost like a burlesque. Lord Ferrers’ case
was evidently one of alcoholic insanity, engrafted upon a heredi-
tary stock. It was shown that he often began his day by drinking
brandy in his tea for breakfast, and he drank steadily and in
excess. He had the delusions of persecution which are common
in alcoholic insanity, and he was probably drunk when he killed
his victim. After the tragedy he sustained a siege for many
hours in his own house, and when finally taken was “armed with
a blunder-buss, two or three pistols and a dagger.” Sometime
before the murder a commission in lunacy had been thought of
for him, but unfortunately it had never been taken out. His
uncle and immediate predecessor in the earklom had been insane,
as had also a paternal aunt. All these facts were brought out
in the evidence. The irony of the trial consisted in the fact of
a man in jeopardy of his life trying to prove his own insanity
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by examining and cross-examining witnesses. He frankly de-
plored the need of doing this, and told the lords naively that this
plan of defence was forced upon him by his family; intimating
that he took not much stock in it himself. The effect can readily
be imagined. The questions and answers are often amusing.
“In what light did you look upon me?” he asked one of his
witnesses. “Rather turned in your head,” was the answer.
“Have you seen any instances of anything like insanity in me?”
was another question. To one question: “Do you look upon
me as affected with any and what distemper?” the witness replied
very frankly: “Indeed, I have looked upon your lordship as a
lunatic for many years.” The accused man even made an attempt
to propound a hypothetical question (the first instance probably
in any court) but it was not allowed. When he came to sum
up, he frankly protested that he was not able to do it, but he
obtained leave to read a statement which he had prepared, or
which had been prepared for him, in writing, in which, with
pathetic helplessness, he said: “I have been driven to the mis-
erable necessity of proving my own want of understanding; and
am told, the law will not allow me the assistance of counsel in
this case, in which, of all others, I should think it most wanted.”
Earl Ferrers, like other insane persons, was opposed to making
a defence of insanity, and said it was forced on him by his
family. His defence and speech were remarkable; the evidence
was clear; and yet this lunatic conducted his own defence by
trying to prove what he said he was mortified to have to acknowl-
edge. The natural result followed. He was promptly convicted
by his peers, and hanged. It is probable that his confinement in
jail before his trial had partly at least restored his mental balance
by depriving him of his accustomed libations.
Such a travesty of justice is sad to contemplate. At the present
time a strong defence could be made in such a case, and a verdict
in the second degree probably obtained without difficulty. The
present-day critics of our legal procedures should reflect upon
the advances that have been made in medical jurisprudence.
The case of Hadfield is also a celebrated one and serves to
illustrate some of the peculiarities in the development of trial
by jury in English law as it affected the insane. Hadfield had
shot at King George III in Drury Lane Theatre, but had missed
4
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his aim, and the King was unharmed. This was an act of treason,
punishable with death, and it was for treason that Hadfield was
tried at the bar of the Court of King’s Bench in 8oo. Now the
old common law had been modified, as we have seen, by the act
7 Will. I I I C. 3, which allowed counsel to a prisoner on trial
for treason. Consequently Hadfield had counsel, as he would
not have had if he had been, like Arnold and Earl Ferrers, on
trial for murder or attempted murder. It is to this fact alone
that we owe the celebrated speech of Erskine in Hadfield’s
defence-a speech which more than any other ever pronounced in
a court of justice tended to change the legal tests for insanity,
for it introduced and established the doctrine that insane delusion
is a good defence in law.
In 1812 Bellingham, a delusional lunatic, shot and killed Mr.
Spencer Perceval, First Lord of the Treasury, in the lobby of the
House of Commons.” He believed that the government owed
him a large sum of money, and failing to obtain redress he had
assassinated this eminent statesman. Bellingham’s case is the
most notorious in the medico-legal annals of England. He shot
Mr. Perceval on the I ith of May; was put on trial the same
week, found guilty after a very short trial, during which a fruit-
less attempt was made to secure delay in order to obtain witnesses
to his insanity, and was hanged on the i8th of the same month;
so that the boast was made that his body was on the dissecting
table in eight days after he had committed his crime. At the
end of the case for the crown the prisoner was called on for his
defence; and he then, pointing to his lawyer who was present,
said: “Is not that gentleman going to speak for me?” On
being told that the law did not allow this, he defended himself.”
He addressed the court, and spoke so coherently that the crown
lawyers exultingly made much of it, as evidence of a sane mind.
A lawyer who was engaged to help him, although not allowed
to appear for him as counsel at the trial in the ordinary sense,
begged vainly for postponement. “I never saw the prisoner
before, and it has not been in our power to bring forth all the
evidence to prove whether he be sane or insane.” But the plea
was vain.
i Collinson, Lunacy, 636.
Century of Law Reform, 2d Lect. by Sir H. B. Poland.
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All this was in accord with the practice that prevailed
less than one hundred years ago in English courts. Sir H. B.
Poland says” that in cases of felony (which included murder,
but not treason) a prisoner’s counsel was only allowed to cross-
examine witnesses, to argue points of law, and to examine wit-
nesses for the defence of the prisoner. But evidently he could
not address the jury. And Chitty tells us that upon a charge of
felony (which included murder) counsel were allowed to the
prisoner only if some point of law should arise fit to be debated.”
Reform in legal procedure moves slowly in England, but popu-
lar indignation was gradually roused against this injustice; and
it found voice in a most unexpected quarter. In 1824 George
Lamb presented a petition to Parliament, signed by members of
the juries serving in criminal cases at the Old Bailey, praying
that the accused in cases of felony (murder, &c.) might have
the benefit of counsel, as in cases of misdemeanor. It was plainly
said by a writer of the time that the juries had become weary
of the continual butchery, and resolved to acquit. It was believed
that innocent persons were often found guilty because of the
absence of counsel; and one telling argument was based on the
helplessness of the insane, when forced to defend themselves
before a jury and against trained lawyers for the crown.
Suppose a crime to have been committed under the influence
of insanity,” exclaimed Sydney Smith; “ is the insane man to plead
his own insanity-to offer arguments to show that lie must have
been mad-and by the glimmerings of his returning reason to
prove that, at a former period, that same reason was utterly
extinct?” This was exactly what had been going on for cen-
turies, but Sydney Smith, although he wrote so eloquently, did
not appear to know it.
Lord Chief Justice Denman, of the Court of King’s Bench,
said that he had once tried two prisoners who were deaf and
dumb; and he exclaimed against the harshness of such a trial
without counsel for the prisoner. It would indeed be hard to
imagine anything more grossly unjust than to try a person who
could neither hear the accusation nor reply to his accuser, and
who was not allowed counsel to hear and reply for him. When
“ Op. cit., p. 50. Footnote to Chitty’s Eng. Statutes, I8, Vol. 3.
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Lord Lovat was tried for treason in 1747 he protested that he
could not conduct his own defence, because he could neither see
nor hear. In consequence a bill was brought into Parliament
to allow counsel to prisoners impeached by that House.
Sydney Smith’s essay,” in 1826, from which we have quoted,
was a masterly criticism of the old law, and it probably had sonic-
thing to do to mould public opinion and lead to reform; but
that reform did not come until 1836, when Parliament passed
the law known as the Prisoner’s Counsel’s Act (6 & 7 Will. IV
C. I 14), which prescribed as follo’ws:
“That all persons tried for felonies shall be admitted, after the
close of the case for the prosecution, to make full answer and
defence thereto, by counsel learned in the law, or by attorneys
in courts where attorneys practice as counsel.”
Thus not until near the middle of the 19th century did England
correct an injustice which had stood for centuries, and not then
without protest. Poland says that, after reading Sydney Smith’s
article in the Edinburgh Review, it is difficult to understand how
the law could have remained unchanged until 1836. But it is
a still more astonishing fact that, according to the same writer,
twelve out of the fifteen highest judges in England strongly con-
demned the bill, and one of them, Mr. Justice Park, said that if
it was allowed to pass he would resign from the bench. Never-
theless the bill did pass, and the learned judge did not resign.
The fact is well known that the insane often object to the
defence of insanity in their behalf. This defence, as a rule, is
not relished by paranoiacs. These lunatics do not like to be called
insane. They resent the imputation most vigorously; for it is
a well-known characteristic of delusional patients to defend their
delusions, and this they will do at the risk of their lives, even
when on trial for murder. Under the old common law such
patients, when obliged to defend themselves without counsel, were
more likely to ruin their cases than to help them. We have seen
Edinburgh Review, Dec., 1826. Sydney Smith’s essay was written as
a review of Stockton On The Practice of not Allowing Counsel to Prison-
ers Accused of Felony, 8vo. London, i826. The review is republished in
Smith’s Collected Essays, London, Longmans, Green, and Co., p.  It
was unsigned in the original. In commenting on the old practice Smith
wrote, “The iron age of Clovis on Clottaire can produce no more atrocious
violation of every good feeling and every good principle.”
1907] JAMES HENDRIE LLOYD 49
how Lord Ferrers apologized for making such a defence, and
said he was forced to do so by his family; he evidently resented
the idea. Another early case was that of Frith,” in 1790, who
protested loudly against the defence of insanity. He had thrown
a stone at the King in his royal coach, and when put on trial he
harangued the court in a crazy manner. A like scene was enacted
at the trial of Pearce,” in 1840, for felonious assault. Insanity
was admitted by the crown, but the prisoner would have none
of it, and insisted on addressing the court and examining the
witnesses himself. These witnesses, called and examined by him,
so far from proving him sane, proved quite the contrary; and he
was found not guilty, on the ground of insanity, in spite of his
protests. His counsel (for this was after the passage of the
Prisoner’s Counsel’s Act, in 1836) said that “he relied on the
prisoner’s denial of his insanity, under the circumstances which
had been proved against him, as one proof of the fact of his
being insane.” But usually, under the old common law, the
very opposite conclusion was drawn by the prosecution. Thus,
as we have seen, Bellingham addressed the court, and spoke so
well and conclusively in an insane speech, that the court accepted
it as an evidence of his sanity. Guiteau derided the idea of his
own insanity; and if he had been compelled, or allowed, to con-
duct his own defence, his trial would probably have been going
on yet.”
There are curious and deep psychological reasons for the old
English common law denying counsel, and even witnesses, to a
prisoner on trial for grave crime. The subject is too involved for
more than a hasty discussion here. One idea was that it was
the business of the court to defend the prisoner; that is, to see
that no injustice was done him. Hence the old saying that the
judge is of counsel for the accused. This was a part of the
orthodox belief of almost every old common-law writer; and was
particularly derided by Sydney Smith. But another and more
occult reason appears to have been that it was deemed a wicked
opposition to the Majesty of the King for any lawyer to get up
22 Howell’s State Trials, 307. “ Reg. vs. Pearce, 9 Car. & P. 667.
“See the writer’s work in Wharton & Still#{233}’sMed. Jurisprudence, th
ed. Vol. i, pp. 84o-&II, from which the above paragraph has been taken
in part.
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in court and deliberately oppose him-for in the fiction of the
law the King is always present in court in the person of one or
more of his judges. The defence of a man who might be guilty
was disloyalty to the King, or at least a disrespect shown to him,
and it was held to be more likely than not a mere effort to fore-
stall justice. As one writer says, it was an “indecency” to
oppose the King’s counsel. This was a prejudice derived from
the civil law of feudal Europe, and was based probably on the
fact that the majority of accused persons who come to trial are
really guilty, and it is the business of the court to demonstrate
that fact. Any opposition, as by counsel for the prisoner, is an
unwarranted interference. The old jurists were keenly alive, in
other words, to the possible abuses of the defence; to all the arts
and wiles and trumped-up pleas that make our present criminal
trials too often such public scandals.
But modern jurists do not see it that way, and it is an axiom
now that an accused man is entitled to his defence. The contrary
savors too much of tyranny. One of the most infamous laws of
Robespierre, during the Reign of Terror, was the law of Twenty-
second Prairial, by which, among other iniquities, counsel was
denied to prisoners accused of treason. This feature aligns this
law with the old English common law, which bore so hard on
the insane. Morley says that “of all laws ever passed in the
world it is the most nakedly iniquitous.”
In times of stress the office of advocate for an unpopular ptis-
oner may be one not only of embarrassment but of danger.
Malesherbes, that grand and venerable man who, at the peril of
his life, undertook the defence of Louis XVI before the Con-
vention, is perhaps the most conspicuous example in history. At
the age of 74 years he attempted to save his King, only to follow
him in a few short months to the guillotine.”
At the trial of Colgosz, the assassin of President McKinley,
the position of counsel for the prisoner was thought to be so
obnoxious that special measures were taken to have it filled; and
the defence was but half-hearted and perfunctory. The man was
really tried by public opinion long before his formal trial in
‘ Critical Miscellanies, Essay on Robespierre, p. zo#{243}.
“ Lamartine’s History of the Girondists, Vol. II, p. 314 et seq. Vol. III,
pp. 411-412.
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court. It was such a case as under the old common law would
not have been allowed counsel at all; and the question of the
man’s insanity was as badly presented as it would have been in
the Court of King’s Bench in the 17th century. Human nature
does not change much, even if the laws do.
It is well perhaps for the modern reader in his complacency
to reflect that in the present day we may have gone to the other
extreme. Some one should write a treatise on the abuses of the
legal art of defence. Certainly we see to-day the prisoner and
his counsel allowed every latitude. Every loop-hole of escape is
opened to him; irrelevant testimony, technicalities, insanity
dodges, appeals to popular prejudice, and by-plays to the jury,
now consume days in the trial of a case in which the issue is so
simple that under the old common law, when courts sat all night,
and juries were not allowed meat, drink or fire, the prisoner
could have been convicted between sunrise and sunrise.
